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Does Europe still need a Fourteenth Company Law Directive?  
 
Maureen Johnson*  
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores the progression of European Law that may have pre-empted the 
introduction of the 14th Company Law Directive, a piece of European secondary 
legislation that has been under discussion for many years as an attempt to solve the 
problem of corporate mobility within the internal market. For so long indeed that it is 
conceivable that judgements of the ECJ and other primary and secondary legislation 
already in force have provided solutions to the corporate mobility question which will 
result in the Directive no longer being necessary.  
 
This article examines the complicated nature of company law particularly the 
interaction of international conflict provisions and the law of the European Internal 
Market.  It considers the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in such 
judgements as Centros and Uberseering, seen by some as an ‘attack’ on the ‘real 
seat’ theory of corporate recognition. It moves on to identify primary and secondary 
legislation, focussing on the Statute for a European Company (SE) as potential ways 
forward for corporate mobility within the EU.  Company law has a multi-layered 
persona, so within the confines of this paper only the concept of tax provisions and 
concerns over employee participation in the event of a change in applicable law will 
be considered. Finally, it will consider the draft 14th Company Law Directive, 
comparing it with the Statute for a European Company and involving a critique of 
articles 10 and 3 as potentially problematic for Member States and possibly providing 
a source of discontent that will make it less likely that the proposed Directive becomes 
adopted as legislation. 
 
The conclusion of the paper will draw on the arguments within the body of the text to 
propose that there is still an inherent need for the proposed directive in order to 
ensure the grant of a fundamental freedom.  
 
Introduction 
 
Treaty regards the differences in national legislation concerning the required 
connecting factor and the question of whether – and if so how – the registered 
office or real head office of a company incorporated under national law may be 
transferred from one Member State to another as problems which are not 
resolved by the rules concerning the right of establishment. 
 
Daily Mail case1 
 
Corporate mobility within the European Union is still a problem.  In spite of nearly 
sixty years of the Common Market and its successor the Internal Market, in spite of 
                                                 
* Maureen Johnson is the European Law Module Leader at the School of Law, University of 
Hertfordshire.  
1 Case 81/87 R v HM Treasury Ex p. Daily Mail [1988] ECR 4583 
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numerous amending treaties and attempts at legislation and conventions, in spite of 
clear primary legislation and in spite of the professed wish of Union businesses, the 
difficulty encountered by a company wishing to move its registered office2 from one 
member state to another is still, in many cases insurmountable. 
 
As part of the Modernisation of European Union company law, the High Level Group 
of Company Law Experts, reporting on the 4th November 2002,3 recommended that 
the European Commission should consider adopting a proposal for the transfer of the 
registered office of a company within the European Union (EU) as a matter of 
urgency.  This would be the long awaited 14th Company Law Directive.  In response, 
the Commission, in its Action Plan of 21st May 20034 undertook to adopt such a 
proposal in the short term, citing it as one of its top priorities.  To this end, the 
Commission launched an Internet consultation on the outline of the planned proposal 
which closed on 15th April 2004, the opening page of which states: 
 
The planned directive would enable companies to transfer their registered office 
from the member state where they are registered (the “home” member state) to 
another member state (the “host” member state) under an appropriate procedure 
providing legal certainty.  A company transferring its registered office would be 
registered in the host member state and would acquire a legal identity there, 
while at the same time being removed from the register in its home member 
state and giving up its legal identity there.5  
 
This appears to be an admirable proposal, startling in its simplicity and common 
sense.  Why then is corporate mobility still such a problem within Europe?   
 
This paper will aim to show some of the complexities of the European Company Law 
programme by focussing on this issue in particular, incorporating as it does the 
historical context of disparate member states, the multi- layered persona’s of the 
corporate body and the unresolved and potentially irresolvable clash between the 
Aquis Communitaire and private international law in general.  Through examination 
of the proposed 14th Company Law Directive, particularly the provisions on taxation 
and employee participation6 a conclusion will be reached on whether this is a 
workable or indeed desirable piece of legislation, or whether it will simply be a 
complex repetition of principles of case law and existing legislation7 which the 
Community as a whole could well do without.  Ultimately, it may be, shown that the 
much discussed proposals for a 14th Company Law Directive may be too controversial 
and, in the light of recent case law and legislation, no longer necessary for the 
sustained progression of Company law in Europe.   
                                                 
2 Or central administration or principle place of business as alternates under Article 48 TEC 
3 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a modern Regulatory Framework for 
Company Law in Europe, Brussels, 4th November 2002 
4 Commission communication to the Council and the European Parliament on modernising company 
law and enhancing corporate governance in the European Union – A plan to move forward (COM 
(2003) 284 final) 
5 http://europa.eu.int/yourvoice/consultations 
6 Problems with the change in law relating to employee contracts are outside the scope of this paper. 
7 Particularly the Company Law Statute 
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Is there a problem?  
 
This is, of course, an historical problem, and one grappled with for many years by  
private international law, and the contracting parties to what would eventually become 
the EU.8  The entire concept of ‘recognition’ of a foreign company was at one time 
uncertain, companies being constructs of the law of a particular country, it was felt 
that once outside that country their continued existence was unsustainable. Within a 
wider, conflicts sense however, ‘recognition’ of a foreign company primarily rests on 
the problem of the lex societatis, or the proper law to which the company is subject as 
regards its formation, internal workings and possible dissolution.  Once it is accepted 
that a company is validly formed according to the law of the state to whose laws it is 
subject, there is usually no problem in the company being recognised as a legal 
person, a bearer of rights and duties, by other states.     
 
But why would a company want to move its head office, or registered office? It may 
be a relevant point that with EU company law harmonisation incomplete, the chances 
of a company choosing to move across a national border are slim and in this respect 
the Fourteenth Company Law Directive will be an unloved and impotent tool. That 
very few corporations presently do move between member states is not an informed 
response, given the complexity of the procedure where it is allowed and the 
consequences when it is not, but it is not difficult to envisage a low demand for the 
true freedom of movement for companies, if and when it is allowed. The many writers 
who point in horror towards the United States and the Delaware effect as the shape of 
things to come are perhaps arriving at simplistic conclusions, overlooking the barriers 
of language and corporate (and national) culture that exist within the European Union.  
The ‘nationality’ of a company is also a prized aspect of its corporate identity and one 
that will not be discarded lightly.9  Within the last 18 months the German car 
manufacturer Volkswagen decided against the development of a new plant in 
Portugal, in spite of much cheaper costs and a more flexible labour market, preferring 
to keep its business within Germany because, inter alia, it was felt that there was 
something about the ‘Germaness’ of the Volkswagen brand which its customers 
identified with.  Similarly, Ford has declined to move production of its Jaguar marque 
to the USA, saying that Jaguar is a ‘British brand’.   
 
On the other hand, the globalisation of the corporation cannot be denied.  The 
recognition of the company as the economic powerhouses of the economy and the 
benefits of economies of scale mean that in order to compete with the American or 
Japanese corporate giant, companies within the EU must be able to shed their national 
constraints.  To be successful in this respect, a company should be able to move 
within the internal market with as much freedom and as little fuss as if it were 
relocating within its ‘home’ member state. 
 
Irrespective of the above arguments, free movement of companies in the sense of 
primary establishment is a clearly given treaty right and should be available even if no 
                                                 
8 For instance the 1956 Draft Treaty of the Hague conference on the mutual recognition of the legal 
personality of companies. 
9 See further Janice Dean, ‘Corporate mobility and Company Law Cultures in Europe’ I.C.C.L.R. 2003, 
14(6), 197-204 
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demand is envisaged, EU law should not subscribe to a de minimis approach to the 
fundamental freedoms.  It would be absurd to describe the free movement of workers 
as a failed exercise because only a tiny minority of European citizens choose to take 
advantage of the provisions.  It is a worthwhile ideology, even from the point of view 
of people who have never used their rights and can never seeing themselves so doing. 
   
The paper will begin by introducing the ‘conflicts’ rules of the member states and will 
then go on to examine the case law of the European Court of Justice in this area, to 
see whether, as some sources claim, the problem of corporate mobility is solved via a 
reading of these judgements.  Primary and secondary legislation already in existence 
will then be appraised and lastly the proposed 14th Company Law Directive itself will 
be considered, in order to come to a conclusion on its usefulness and desirability. 
 
The problem defined – case law  
 
In general terms, the member states of the European Union subscribe to one of two 
different ways of recognising the legal personality of a company or firm, each linked 
to a chosen ‘connecting factor’ to the member state in question.  A member state 
which is an incorporation theorist will recognise a company as a legal person under 
the law of the state in which it was incorporated, (the incorporation being the 
‘connecting factor’ to the chosen state).  This is essentially unproblematic; a company 
validly incorporated under the law of a member state is therefore recognised by all 
other incorporation states.  The UK, Ireland and the Netherlands operate this system 
of recognition, the Nordic 10 registration system in the Netherlands being in reality a 
modified application of the incorporation theory.   
 
A criticism of the incorporation theory is that it leads, particularly in a trading bloc 
such as the EU, to ‘forum shopping’ by managers anxious to secure the most 
favourable legal climate for their company, the much discussed ‘Delaware effect’. 
The European Court of Justice has made it clear in, inter alia the Centros11 case, that 
this is something which is not prohibited by European law.  It is even possible to see 
that this kind of ‘consumer choice’ available to companies may eventually lead to a 
levelling of company law regimes across the EU as states with less attractive laws 
soften their approach to prevent ‘drift’ into other member states.12 
 
Other member states, for instance Germany have as the connecting factor the head 
office or principle place of business of the company, or the ‘real seat’.  A real seat 
theorist will only recognise a company as a legal person, (by virtue of it being validly 
formed within the lex societatis) and subject to the laws of a state, with the protection 
that entails for individuals ‘behind the corporate veil’,13 if the ‘real seat’ of that 
company is in the member state in which the company is incorporated.  For instance a 
company incorporated in England with its head office or principle place of business in 
                                                 
10 Also applied by Denmark, Finland and Sweden 
11 Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459 
12 See however the article by Mathius Siems, “Convergence, competition, Centros and Conflicts of 
Law: European law in the 21st Century” (2002) European Law Review 27(1), pp 47 –59, where the 
author argues that the ‘Delaware effect’ in Europe may be more feared than likely to happen. 
13 See Salomon v Salomon [1897] 45 WR 193, HL 
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France would be seen by German law to be subject to the laws of France.  If the 
company was not validly incorporated according to French law, then German law 
would not consider it to be a legal person at all.  While the incorporation system 
appears to be a straightforward one, which can be seen as analogous to citizenship for 
a natural person, the adherence by member states to the real seat theory is 
problematic.  It becomes more complicated still when a company moves its head 
office out of a real seat state (or is deemed to have moved its head office or principle 
place of business) and then becomes unrecognisable as a valid company within its 
‘home state’.  It will therefore not be recognised even by incorporation theorists.   
 
While it is plain that the incorporation theory is more conducive to the establishment 
of ‘an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured’ as enunciated in the preamble to the TEC it would be 
hasty to denounce the real seat theory as against European law or in any way 
discriminatory as the regime is equally applicable to domestic and non-domestic 
companies alike.  Further, it is argued that the real seat theory is justified in order to 
ensure that the law most relevant to the company is the one that governs it, and if the 
company does not conform to the rules of that member state (the one where it 
conducts most of its business), then other states should not recognise it as a company 
at all.  On the other hand, the ‘real seat’ theory can present a nightmare to legal 
certainty, particularly in the present globalised economy, if a dispute arises as to 
where the real seat of a company actually is.  It is easily conceivable in the 21st 
century that a company’s administrative centre is on one continent, its manufacturing 
base on another, and its distributors and customers on a third, leading to a complex, 
individualistic balancing of the concepts of ‘head office’ or ‘principle place of 
business’ to enable a judgement to be made about which country’s law the company is 
subject to, which may not be the same system as the company itself claims.  It should 
also not be forgotten, that while the incorporation theory facilitates the secondary 
establishment of companies within the EU, it actually forbids a company from 
moving its registered office, (i.e. primary establishment) to another member state 
without liquidation.  In this respect, neither of the conflict rules of the member states 
could be said to be better than the other for ‘true’ corporate mobility within the EU. 
This is a general overview of the way the real seat theory works, although different 
member states adherent to it may allow the emigration of a company subject to 
shareholder votes and the amendment of the company constitutions.  In reality 
however, these processes are complicated and may demand the liquidation and 
subsequent re-incorporation of a company under the laws of the new ‘host’ state, 
something which will give rise to a number of tax liabilities and which a company 
will wish to avoid.   
 
It is important here to differentiate between the real issue that needs to be solved by 
EU law, that of the unproblematic transfer of a company’s registered office – whether 
or not the conflicts laws of that member state demand the head office is in the same 
state - and the transfer of a de facto head office, or something that is seen as a de facto 
head office by a member state.  The former is the equivalent of a natural person 
wishing to change his nationality, as a company can only be a creature of national 
law, and forms the basis for the proposed 14th Company Law Directive, the latter is a 
problem for freedom of establishment under Articles 43 TEC (old Art 52) and Article 
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48 TEC (old Art 58), which some may consider solved after the cases of Segers,14 
Centros15and Inspire Art 16and Uberseering.17 
 
Centros was seen by some18 as a ‘first move’ by the ECJ to refute the alignment of the 
real seat theory with EU law, by denying that Denmark could refuse to register a 
company incorporated in England but which only conducted business in Denmark, in 
spite of the fact that the English incorporation was purely in order to circumvent the 
Danish minimum capital requirement.19  This, commentators contended, was the 
equivalent of the company moving its ‘real seat’, a move that Denmark was forced to 
accept.  This slightly bizarre reasoning tends to overlook the fact that Denmark is an 
incorporation country and what it was in fact doing was acting in a discriminatory and 
disproportionate manner towards a company validly incorporated in another member 
state and hence within the protection of Art 43 and 48. It is plainly discriminatory to 
treat Centros in a way that a company incorporated in Denmark would not have been 
treated.  The court was also careful to say that Denmark could take measures to 
combat fraud or to intervene if the company was trying to avoid obligations towards 
private or public creditors in Denmark, but its refusal to register the company was 
disproportionate.   
 
In Uberseering a company was formed under the law of the Netherlands and had its 
registered office there, but then, according to Germany, transferred its real seat to 
Germany.  As the company was not formed according to German law, the German 
courts would not recognise Uberseering as a legal person able to be a party to legal 
proceedings within Germany.  The ECJ held that Germany could not refuse to 
recognise Uberseering and locus standii must be granted.  
 
These judgements were hailed by some commentators as the death of the real seat 
doctrine, open to the interpretation that EU law and the ECJ favours the incorporation 
theory and rejects the real seat theory, but is seen by others, the author20 included, as 
merely a restatement on the rules of freedom of establishment contained in Articles 43 
and 48 TEC, and enunciated years previously in cases such as Segers and Commission 
v France.21 It is perhaps worthy of note that the ECJ in Centros did not once refer to 
the freedom of primary establishment. 
 
Article 43 is a dynamic piece of legislation, clearly focussed on achieving the goal of 
the internal market: 
 
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment of nationals of a member state in the territory of 
                                                 
14 Case 79/85 Segers v Bedrijfsvereniging voor Bank en Verzekeringswezen [1987] 2 CMLR 247 
15 Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459 
16 Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd 
17 Case C-208/00 Uberseering v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement. 
18 See for instance Alexandros Roussos ‘Realising the Free Movement of Companies’ [2001] European 
Business Law Review Jan/Feb p 7 
19 Some £17,000 as opposed to £100 in the UK 
20 See M Johnson  ‘Roll on the 14 th – EC case law fails to solve the problems of corporate mobility – 
again.’  Hertfordshire Law Journal 2(2) pp 9 -18 
21 Case 270/83 Commission v France [1986] ECR 273 
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another member state shall be prohibited.  Such prohibition shall also apply to 
restrictions on the setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals 
of any member state established in the territory of any member state. 
Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities 
as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular 
companies and firms within the meaning of Article 48, under the conditions laid 
down for its own nationals by the law of the country where the establishment is  
effected, subject to the provisions relating to capital.22 
 
Article 48 TEC states: 
 
Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a member state and 
having their registered office, central administration or principle place of 
business within the Community shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be 
treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of member states. 
 
The article then goes on to define ‘companies or firms’. 
 
Member states are thereby instructed, by primary legislation, to treat a legal person in 
the same way as it would be obliged to treat a natural person exercising their right to 
free movement around the EU, a right encapsulated within the citizenship provisions23 
added to the treaty by the Treaty of European Union in 1992.  This right must 
necessarily be qualified, as has been recognised by the ECJ, because a legal person is 
capable of having a presence in more than one member state simultaneously, and 
hence an exact analogy cannot apply. Case law however, is clear, once a company is a 
‘national’ of a member state, by whatever that member states connecting factor is, by 
incorporation or by having its real seat on the territory, all other member states must 
allow secondary establishment of that company on their territory in a non-
discriminatory manner.  Derogations from this rule will only be allowed either under 
Article 46 or, under the mandatory requirements doctrine established in Cassis,24 
providing the requirement is objectively justified, non-discriminatory and 
proportionate.    
 
These articles are appropriate then, in a point reiterated in Uberseering, where 
secondary establishment is sought.  Having been duly incorporated under Dutch law, 
it was not open to Germany to challenge the status of the company in question.  
Neither Arts 43 and 48, nor this line of case law however, addresses the problem of 
the bete noir of EU freedom of establishment in company law, the real seat doctrine 
and the member states right to choose it as its connecting factor.  If Uberseering had 
been primarily established in Germany, and had then moved its head office or 
principle place of business to another member state, it would have then been 
unrecognised in its ‘home’ state and therefore not a ‘company or firm formed in 
accordance with the law of a member state’, and hence would fall outside the 
protection of Arts 43 and 48 anyway.  
 
                                                 
22 As amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
23 Articles 17 and 18 TEC 
24  Case 120/68 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Brantwein  [1979] ECR 649 
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The real problem to be grappled with by the 14th Company law directive is the 
problem of primary establishment, where a French company C, wishes to become, 
perhaps for reasons of tax, or convenient location, an Irish company.  Here as well, 
the natural person analogy to a legal person, holds up.  If I am a French Citizen, it is 
not open to me simply to take an aeroplane to Ireland and become Irish.  Although I 
am free to live and work in Ireland, my ‘Frenchness’ is inescapable at least until I 
have satisfied the individual requirements that might be imposed upon me by the Irish 
state before I can obtain Irish citizenship.  Why should a legal person be treated any 
differently?  The ECJ said in the Daily Mail case: 
 
It should be borne in mind that, unlike natural persons, companies are creatures 
of the law, and, in the present state of Community law, creatures of national 
law.  They exist only by virtue of the varying na tional legislation which 
determines their incorporation and functioning.25   
 
Ultimately, as Rammeloo26 suggests, the anthromorphism of  a legal person and the 
approximation of the legal forms may not be helpful as it is an over-simplification of 
the corporate form, which needs to address many different areas of law, tax, 
employment, etc. and can be physically present in dozens, if not hundreds of locations 
simultaneously.  However, the approximation is the one that is made in the TEC, 
granting the legal person the same rights as the natural person in this context, so it is 
difficult to escape. 
 
The initial six member states of the European Economic Community27 were, at the 
inception of the EEC, all adherents of the ‘real seat’ theory, although it is interesting 
to note that even though the 1956 draft treaty of the Hague Conference on the mutual 
recognition of the legal personality of companies never entered into force due to lack 
of ratification by contracting parties, the Netherlands passed a bill purporting to 
implement the treaty which stated that ‘the Netherlands is not a country whose law 
recognises the siege reel as defined in Art 2 [of the draft of the Hague Treaty].’28 
Later attempts by the EEC to resolve the matter of the conflict between incorporation 
and real seat member states and especially between the latter concept and the free 
movement provisions have been no more successful.  The 1968 draft treaty on the 
mutual recognition of companies signed in Brussels on the 29th February 1968 was 
felt to be a flawed document which attempted to reconcile the two plainly 
irreconcilable systems of recognition by offering room for both of them to exist 
simultaneously within the remit of the treaty.  Clarke29 called the draft treaty ‘a 
typical, but extreme example of a Community fudge, which, in the event, satisfied no 
one.’30 
 
                                                 
25 Case 81/87 see fn 1 infra p 1 
26 Stephan Rammeloo, “Corporations in Private International Law – A European Perspective” Oxford 
University Press.   
27 France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg 
28 Supra. Rammeloo n. 26 p 25 
29 M.G.Clarke QC ‘The conflicts of law dimension’ Corporate law.  The European dimension. Ed. A 
Celia Tranting.  Butterworths 
30 ibid p164 
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The Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and 
Commercial matters, signed in Brussels on 27th January 1968 also encountered 
problems, since the national court first seized was allowed to inflict its own 
recognition rules on the dispute, allowing the added confusion of either positive or 
negative jurisdictional conflicts, where either two, or no national courts were capable 
of claiming jurisdiction.   
 
The Lamot Doctrine   
 
Interestingly, this problem of a potential dual nationality is also perceived under a 
doctrine which has been quietly facilitating corporate mobility between Belgium and 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands31 since 1959 – the Lamot32 doctrine.  The 
Belgium Supreme Court, on being asked to decide a case concerning the transfer of 
the head office of Lamot Ltd, a company registered in England to the city of 
Mechelen in Belgium, concluded inter alia; 
 
…it cannot be concluded from any Belgian legislative provision solely on the 
ground that a company has transferred its head office in the way described 
above, it has ceased to be a legal person under Belgian law. 33 
 
There are five conditions which must be fulfilled if the seat transfer is to be realised:  
 
· The absence of fraus legis; 
· All legal requirements of the emigration company must be obeyed; 
· The immigration country must not oppose the continued existence of the legal 
person; 
· The continued existence of the legal person must be allowed under the law of 
the emigration company;34 and  
· The structure of the company should be fundamentally compatible with the 
law of the immigration country. 35 
 
This being a decision of national law taken by a national court it is perhaps unrealistic 
to expect such a pragmatic approach be adopted by the wider EU community.  The 
doctrine certainly is not without its problems, temporary dual nationality being among 
them, and the Courts legal reasoning becomes puzzling when applied to the facts of 
the case, but a mutually agreed and agreeable solution to corporate mobility between 
member states with disparate conflicts laws was thereby engendered and has been 
followed ever since.  Rammeloo36 makes the salient point that the decision by this 
Belgian court: ‘Which after all dates back to the mid-1950’s, seems to be more in the 
spirit of EC law than Daily Mail.’ 
  
                                                 
31 Note that the UK and Netherlands are incorporation states, Belgium is a real seat theorist. 
32 Cass. 12 Nov 1956 , Pas 1966 I p.336 
33 Rammeloo’s translation – see fn 26 pp 281 
34 This will principally favour incorporation states 
35 See Rammeloo – fn 26 post 
36 Ibid 
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The resolution to the wider problem of corporate mobility, the struggle between 
allowing a company its choice of law (incorporation) and enforcing a method of 
legislative control over the company (real seat) appears, after case law and 
conventions, as far away as ever.  To move forward, either a decision needs to be 
taken to bring all EU member states into line, or a third way of recognition needs to 
be established within the Community, favouring neither pre-existing rule.  
 
Legislation  
 
Case law, it would seem, has little to offer to the problems of primary establishment, 
dealing – as the above cases do – with the concept of secondary establishment of a 
company validly incorporated in another member state.  Arguments that the ECJ has 
signalled the death of the real seat doctrine in Centros may also be premature, 
particularly as this idea seems to go against the general tide of secondary legislation in 
this area currently being produced.  It is to this legislation that this paper will now 
turn. 
 
In one sense, the idea and the object of the 14th Company Law Directive are already 
obsolete.  Specific, primary legislation has been in place since the inception of the 
European Economic Community in 1957 to deal with the issue of corporate mobility 
within the Common Market;- Art 293, (formerly 220) states:  
 
Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each 
other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationa ls: 
…The mutual recognition of companies or firms within the meaning of the 
second paragraph of Article 48, the retention of legal personality in the event of 
a transfer of their seat from one country to another, and the possibility of 
mergers between companies or firms governed by the laws of different 
countries…37 
 
This Article gave rise to the ill- fated draft treaty of the Hague Treaty, 38 and it may be 
safe to assume this Article was the one the ECJ had in mind when it spoke about 
‘future legislation’ in Daily Mail.  It is true that the problems of ratifying such a 
convention with 25 member states would be formidable, and history records the 
failures past, even with many fewer member states.  The wording of the Article may 
however be instructive.  Although a convention ratified by all member states is clearly 
one way of fulfilling the obligations of Article 293, ‘enter into negotiations with each 
other’ could also suggest a member state by member state approach, with agreements 
brought into being as and when the issue of corporate migration arises between any 
two member states.  The logistics are difficult to imagine, but European Union 
Countries have little problem in negotiating reciprocal agreements for corporate 
recognition and mobility rights between themselves and non-EU countries, for 
example Germany has such an agreement with the USA, and Italy has already 
negotiated reciprocal rights with other member states, allowing companies to retain 
legal personality when transferring between member states.  In this light, the 
intractability of member states over their clear obligations in Art 293 become suspect, 
                                                 
37 Article 293 TEC 
38 See page 11 infra 
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and the ECJ is seen to display a rare modesty in not insisting treaty obligations are 
enforced.  That a Court which has instigated legislative supremacy, direct and indirect 
effect and state liability as a means to efficate Community law and values, should be 
so wary of such a comparatively minor piece of the treaty, (at least in effect) is 
puzzling.  No less so is the Commissions perceived unwillingness to bring Article 226 
actions against member states for breach of Art 293.  However, there are currently no 
such negotiations between member states, either pending, or completed under Art 293 
TEC. 
 
Another treaty provision that may be relevant is Article 65(b) TEC, which states: 
 
Measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border 
implications…in so far as necessary for the proper functioning of the internal 
market, shall include… 
(b) Promoting the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States 
concerning the conflict of laws and of jurisdiction. 
 
Company law is plainly within the remit of ‘civil matters having cross-border 
implications’ and judicial cooperation on a national level would do much to alleviate 
the harshness of the individual member states conflicts provisions.  Indeed, this seems 
to be precisely what occurred in the Belgium courts in 1959 at the inception of the 
Lamot doctrine – proof again, in spite of the difficulties of the doctrine – that cross 
border corporate mobility can transcend conflicts provisions.  However, as far as other 
member states are concerned, in the field of corporate mobility at least, article 65 has 
been no more noticed or adhered to than article 293.  Further, article 65 has not been 
mentioned in the ECJ’s judgements in this area.  It could be argued that article 65 is 
procedural in nature, but the clear mention of the functioning of the internal market 
and the conflict provisions may invite another interpretation. 
 
The fact that such obvious, primary legislation has been virtually ignored by the EC 
institutions is one of the reasons that the 14th Company Law directive has become 
necessary for corporate governance within the EU.  The directives long gestation and 
tortuous labour have already been alluded to, but another piece of EC legislation 
which came into force on the 8th October 2004 may have made the need for the 14th 
less pressing than it hitherto has been. 
 
The European Company Statute 
 
The idea of a truly European company has been around since 1959, when the concept 
was introduced by Professor Saunders in the opening lecture of the Rotterdam School 
of Economics.39  It too has had a troubled history, beset with working groups and 
radical, rejected proposals,40 before agreement on the Statute for the European 
                                                 
39 Naar een Europese NV  delivered on 22nd October 1959 
40 Among others ;  Proposal for a Council Regulation embodying a Statute for the European company 
(OJ C 124, 10th Oct 1970), Amended proposal for a Council regulation on the statute for European 
companies (COM (75) 150 final), Proposal for a Council regulation on the statute for a European 
company and Proposal for a Council directive complementing the statute for a European company with 
regard to the involvement of employees in the European company (OJ C 263, 16th Oct 1989), Amended 
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Company was reached at the European Council at Nice in December 2002.  The 
Statute41and the Supplementary Directive on Employee Involvement42created a new 
legal form of European Company or Societas Europaea (SE) which is intended to be 
available to companies above and beyond the legal forms available at a national level.  
This could be likened to a ‘European citizenship’ in that it does not impinge upon the 
nationality of the legal person, which has to be granted by the member state where the 
company is registered, but gives rise to an extra bundle of rights and advantages not 
available to the national corporate form, among them, the right to corporate mobility 
within the EU subject to a specific set of processes which must be followed.  
 
This new corporate form, and new set of processes, however is intrinsically linked 
with the country where the company is registered by being subject to many of the 
company laws applicable to a non-SE company within that member state.43  As far as 
corporate mobility is concerned, the Statute makes what may be considered a 
surprising choice, by opting for the Real Seat connecting factor as mandatory for 
SE’s.  This is sometimes seen as the ‘hardest’ rule of the two connecting factors, the 
least flexib le and the most restrictive of movement within the Internal Market, as well 
as going against the general movement against the real seat theory that may be evident 
in case law such as Centros.  By choosing this as a mandatory connecting factor, the 
drafters of the statute leave themselves open to the criticism that they seem to be 
actively discouraging corporate mobility within the EU.   Critics of this choice by the 
drafters of the Statute may have overlooked the ‘new’ circumstances under which 
companies are required to conform to the real seat theory.   
 
Problems with the real seat theory have arisen, it must be remembered, in cases 
regarding the secondary establishment of companies, and principally because of the 
wording of Art 48 which demands that a company seeking the right to establishment 
must be ‘formed in accordance with the law of a member state’.  In the scenario of a 
company wishing to exercise the freedom of primary establishment, which would be 
the case under the European Company Statute, the adoption of the real seat criteria is 
good for legal certainty as it will not allow the formation of  ‘brass plate’ companies, 
something that has been a bone of contention amongst member states in cases such as 
Centros and Inspire Art, fearful of fraud, yet restricted in the measures available to 
them by virtue of Art 43 and ECJ case law.  The link with the company law of the 
member state in which the company was registered would therefore be guaranteed, 
but the Statute may still be seen to not discourage ‘fo rum shopping’ by companies 
because of the use it makes of national law in the areas not covered by the new 
legislation.  A straightforward harmonisation of all aspects of company law would be 
seen as removing incentives for corporate mobility but the use of a hybrid mix of 
harmonisation where appropriate and national law at other times means an SE may 
still be attracted to a particular member state because of its taxation44 regime, (and be 
able to move to that member state without dissolution), because the question of 
                                                                                                                                            
proposal for a Council regulation (EEC) on the statute for a European company (OJ C 176, 8th July 
1991). 
41 Council Regulation (EC) no. 2157/2001 of 8th October 2001 
42 Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8th October 2001 
43 See Recital 20 European Company Statute 
44 Or competition, intellectual property or insolvency – Recital 20 
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taxation remains outside the European Company Statute and so subject to the national 
law where the SE is registered.  This would still allow member states to attempt to 
attract companies to their territory by having an attractive company law regime and 
may lead to a useful harmonisation of company law by consent in the long term as 
member states disposed of onerous company law provisions which were ‘out of step’ 
with the laws of other member states. 
 
Tax Provisions  
 
The other major criticism of the European Company Statute is that it omits the tax 
regime from its remit, but as has been pointed out, the disparity of the national 
systems could be a positive boon to encouraging corporate migration leading to a 
gradual harmonisation of tax regimes by consent, a much more acceptable outcome 
than a proscribed harmonisation by application of ECJ case law or contested 
legislation.  There are however, several tax advantages to be had by forming an SE, 
for instance being able to balance out profits and losses made by parts of the company 
which are no longer considered to be subsidiaries, but as establishments under the 
same company umbrella.  
 
Employee Participation  
 
The European Company Statute has a companion Directive45 on the involvement of 
employees, which is necessary due to the wide divergence of systems of employee 
involvement in corporate decisions throughout the EU.  The problem of employee 
rights in the event of a corporate transfer from one member state to another has been 
one of the major sticking points of the 14th Company Law Directive.  Member states 
have been understandably anxious not to find companies able to circumvent their own 
stricter systems of employee participation (and hence protection), by migration, or to 
have to accommodate versions of participation which have arisen in other Member 
states where a company may have migrated from, but which have no equivalence 
within the legal system of the host state. 
 
Based on the Davignon Group Final report, the Directive basically adopts a ‘hands 
off’ approach by relying initially on the concept of freedom of negotiation between 
the parties for three of the four corporate forms permissible under the ECS.46  Only if 
the parties fail to agree within a specific time deadline do ‘standard’ rules come into 
play.  These rules walk a fine line between trying not to impinge on national company 
law rules and traditions, while conterminously retaining rights acquired by employees 
prior to the establishment of the SE, and proceed on the ‘before and after’ principle 
described in Recital 18 of the Directive.  These rules apply only to the formation of a 
SE in the first instance.  If an SE, once established, wishes to transfer its registered 
office (and hence, under real seat theory, its head office or principle place of business 
as well) employees have less protection. 
 
                                                 
45 See fn 42 post 
46 By merger, by creation of a common subsidiary (subsidiary SE), by creation of a holding company  
(holding SE), or by conversion.  The latter of this list are subject to slightly different rules. 
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Article 8(2)b and Article 8(3) mentions that the implications for employees and their 
involvement should be explained in the transfer proposal,47 assuming, it can be 
supposed, that having made appropriate arrangements for employee participation (or 
otherwise) depending upon the ‘free negotiation’ or the ‘before and after’ principle on 
the formation of the SE, on the occasion of the transfer of the registered office there 
will be employee representatives already in place (or otherwise) to protect the 
interests of the workers.  Failing that, it may be assumed that the national employment 
laws will apply to workers who lose their positions or otherwise suffer through the 
transfer going ahead.   
 
This may be felt to be an unsatisfactory scenario.  The individuals with the most to 
lose in a company transfer of head office will not be the shareholders or the creditors, 
who indeed may be the major beneficiaries of any transfer for cost or taxation 
reasons, but the workers in the company.  As the subject is transfer of head office 
between member states, it may be totally impractical for many workers to follow the 
new registered office out of its home state, facing as they would the necessity to move 
their place of abode and learn a new language in many cases, although border 
situations may be much less disruptive.  The practical outcome of the transfer for 
employees then would be redundancy.  On the other hand it may be felt that 
employees in this situation deserve no special treatment above the many employees 
who lose their jobs every day for all sorts of reasons, and a company with much to 
gain by migration would have to factor the costs – both social and economic – into its 
decision to move, a decision which would not be taken lightly. However, the plans 
made for employee protection upon the formation of an SE do seem to count for little 
or nothing if that SE then wants to move its registered office away from its home 
state.  Even more alarmingly, if the 14th Company Law Directive ever becomes law, 
the employee protection will be identical to the SE provisions, with the Directive 
being amended to cover the fourteenth Directive as well.    
 
However, Rajak48 makes an interesting plea for employee participation and co-
determination to be left to be considered at other times and by other legislative or 
other acts.  He argues that these concerns have no place in the regulation of company 
law which should properly deal with how the legal person is formed, operates and can 
be un-formed.  This would certainly make for a less complicated Company law 
programme within the EC, and would facilitate agreement between member states, 
but the clean separation of the two areas is unlikely to occur, and serves to emphasise 
the multi-party aspects of company law as a whole. 
                  
The European Company Statute then provides a detailed procedure for the transfer of 
an SE from one member state to another without dissolution even where the national 
law of the member state forbids such an action for companies otherwise registered on 
its territory.  The perennial problem of the conflicting ‘connecting factor’ has been 
neatly solved in the regulation, by the wholesale adoption of the real seat theory.  In 
the event of a transfer of an SE from one member state to another, but where the head 
                                                 
47 ‘The management or administrative organ shall draw up a report explaining and justifying the legal 
and economic aspects of the transfer and explaining the implications of the transfer for shareholders, 
creditors and employees’ Article 8 (3)  
48 Supra  n. 59.   
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office does not accompany the registered office (ie the real seat theory is not adhered 
to), the legislation gives powers to the member state where the SE is registered to 
oblige the SE to rectify the position.  Where an SE fails to do so, the Member state 
where the SE is registered must take steps to liquidate the company and must set up a 
judicial remedy which has a suspenseful effect. 
 
The procedure for the migrating company to follow is laid down principally in Article 
8 of the European Company Statute paragraphs 2 to 13, paragraph 14 allows member 
states to refuse to transfer the registered office of an SE on the grounds of public 
interest, (and subject to judicial review), and paragraphs 15 and 16 are protective 
measures to prevent fraud and to safeguard creditor and other interests.49 
 
The European Economic Interest Grouping    
 
Small firms, companies or indeed individuals not eligible to form an SE may consider 
a European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) as an alternative. A Regulation 
adopted in 198550 allows for a group to be formed ‘to facilitate or develop the 
economic activities of its members.’51  The use of an EEIG is a way for smaller 
commercial bodies to cooperate with others from different member states, by pooling 
resources or skills to the benefit of all the participants and possible academic or 
technical advancement that would not have been achievable by individuals acting 
alone.  This regulation is relevant to the present discussion as it clearly provides for 
the ‘official address’ of the EEIG to be transferred from one member state to another 
while maintaining its capacity as a legal person by virtue of Article 13.  
 
Is the 14th Company Law Directive then pre-empted by the European Company 
Statute? It is submitted that this is not the case.  The plain truth is that the European 
Company Statute does not solve, or even pretend to tackle the problems of corporate 
mobility apparently given to companies and firms under Article 48 TEC.  The  
creation of a new corporate form is a major step forward in European company law, 
but does not alter the position of a validly constructed national corporation wishing to 
move its registered office or de facto head office to another member state and be 
subject to the laws of that member state without liquidation.  Should a company that 
wishes to move its registered office or de facto head office be obliged to change its 
corporate form in order to take advantage of a plainly expressed right given in the 
treaty?  If the company is only present in one member state it will anyway not be 
eligible to form a European Company.  A company which wishes to become an SE by 
transformation must already have a subsidiary governed by the law of another 
member state for at least two years.52 This ensures the genuine nature of the trans-
national element it has been felt necessary to insist upon in an SE.  If the European 
Company proves to be a simple and successful format, then the ‘carrot’ of easier 
migration may tempt companies to convert or otherwise adopt the form.  This would 
be advantageous to the cohesiveness of European Company law as a whole as, over 
time, the SE becomes the regular corporate form and the idea of a company as a 
                                                 
49 See further discussion Section II – post. 
50 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2137/85 of 25  July 1985 on the European Interest Grouping (EEIG). 
51 ibid. Article 3.  
52 Council Regulation (EC) 2157/2001 recital 11 
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creature purely of national law becomes obsolete. Clearly a long-term goal.  As usual 
however, the ‘transition’ period would be one of uncertainty and discrimination 
particularly against small companies which would not be able to afford the start up 
capital of an SE of EUR 120,000.  These companies, possibly the most likely to move 
between member states due to their relative uncomplicated systems of production and 
management, would be prevented from easy migration under the SE corporate form. 
The treatment of employees in the event of a company migration does however seem 
to be solved through Directive 2001/86/EC which has been deemed acceptable by all 
the member states.  It may be however, that member states will choose to implement 
the legislation in ways which may give stronger protection to employee interests than 
the directive requires, taking the directive as a minimum standard and hence the 
problem will be a recurring one. 
 
Ultimately of course, neither the European Company Statute nor the EEIG legislation 
achieves the freedom of primary establishment for legal persons in line with Article 
48 TEC.  These pieces of agreed legislation do however prove that member states are 
not averse to relaxing their preferred conflicts rules in the face of workable 
harmonisation that does not appear to be detrimental to their national corporate 
interests.  Maybe this is the reason for the agreement on the SE Statute.  Member 
states may feel it has little relevance to their systems or that it will not prove a popular 
corporate form.  The EEIG certainly seems to have been helpful in allowing smaller 
companies to form prosperous links with other such bodies and any transfer of 
registered or head office occurring will have minimal impact on the member states as 
the EEIG of itself is not allowed to make profits, and as such will be very small fry as 
regards taxation revenue for a member state.  A country will clearly gain from the 
kind of link available by virtue of formation of an EEIG to boost the development and 
business of its own small companies with no corresponding loss if the ‘head office ‘ 
of the EEIG itself is transferred to another member state.      
 
The conclusion of this brief look at some relevant EU law is that apparently workable 
legislation exists that allows and encourages corporate mobility with little problem or 
complaint from member states.  This is encouraging for European company law as a 
whole, as is the successful introduction of the SE statute after so many years, but it 
does beg the question that if a workable solution has been found, why is the 
fourteenth company law directive still getting such a rough ride, and will it – 
ultimately – overtake the thirteenth law directive53 as the longest running piece of 
potential legislation that never was. 
 
The Fourteenth Company Law Directive  
 
The search for a workable directive to facilitate the corporate mobility denied to the 
legal person in Daily Mail began soon after that case in 1993 with the publication of a 
study by the Commission54 which led to the draft proposal for a Fourteenth Directive 
on the transfer of the registered office or de facto head office to an other member state 
                                                 
53 The ‘take -over’ directive aimed to protect (inter alia) the interests of shareholders when their 
company is subject to a takeover bid or a change of control.  
54 ‘Study on the transfer of the head office of a company from one member state to another’  - KPMG 
European Business Centre, Brussels 1993 
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with a change in applicable law, issued in 1997.  The proposal draws its validity from 
Article 44 TEC which begins:  
 
In order to attain freedom of establishment as regards a particular activity, the 
Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 25155 and 
after consulting the Economic and Social Committee shall act by means of 
directives.56 
 
The long awaited fourteenth company law directive avoids the  perennial problem of 
seeming to favour one set of conflict rules over another, by introducing a ‘third way’ 
for corporate mobility to be undertaken and leaves member states rules on primary 
establishment untouched. Companies (and the directive applies only to companies, not 
to firms, thereby engendering a split between the incorporated and the unincorporated 
which does not exist in the Treaty provisions) will only be ‘allowed’ to migrate and 
become subject to the laws of another member state when they follow the procedure 
set down in the directive.  
 
The new procedure put forward in the proposal for the fourteenth company law 
directive (hereinafter ‘the directive’) is almost directly synonymous with the one 
adopted in the European Company Statute (hereinafter ‘the statute’):  
 
                                                 
55 Article 251 refers to the use of the co-decision procedure for the legislative process 
56 Article 44 TEC, s1 
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The statute The directive 
 
The transfer proposal including; 
Proposed office 
Proposed statute  
Proposals regarding employee 
participation 
The proposed transfer timetable 
Rights for protection of shareholders 
and/or creditors 
Article 8(2) 
Transfer proposal including; 
Proposed office 
Proposed statute  
Proposals regarding employee 
participation 
The proposed transfer timetable 
Article 4(1) 
Publication of the transfer proposal in 
line with directive 68/151 EEC 57 
Article 8(2) 
Publication of the transfer proposal in 
line with directive 68/151 EEC 
Article 4(2) 
Management or administrative organ 
draws up a report justifying legal and 
economic reasons for the proposed 
transfer and the likely effect on 
shareholders, creditors and employees 
Article 8(3) 
Management or administrative organ 
draws up a report justifying legal and 
economic reasons for the proposed 
transfer and the likely effect on members 
and employees 
Article 5(1) 
Creditors and shareholders must be able 
to examine the transfer proposal and 
report at least one month before the 
general meeting and to take away free 
copies of the documents if required 
Article 8(4) 
Creditors and shareholders must be able 
to examine the transfer proposal and 
report at least one month before the 
general meeting and to take away free 
copies of the documents if required 
Article 5(2)  
General meeting to decide transfer of seat 
Must be at least two months after the 
publication of the transfer proposal58 
General meeting to decide transfer of seat 
Must be at least two months after the 
publication of the transfer proposal 
Publication of the decision and the 
amendment to the company statute in line 
with directive 68/151 EEC by MS in 
Which company has it’s registered office 
 
Publication of the decision and the 
amendment to the company statute in line 
with directive 68/151 EEC by MS into 
whose jurisdiction company is 
transferring  
Article 6(4) 
Competent authority in MS in which 
company has it’s registered office must 
issue a certificate stating all formalities 
have been complied with before the 
transfer  
Article 8(8) 
Competent authority in Ms in which 
company has it’s registered office or De 
facto head office must issue a certificate 
stating all formalities have been complied 
with 
Article 9 
The SE is registered in the  ‘host’ member 
state.  Once this is done, notification to 
the ‘home’ member state allows deletion 
The company is registered in the ‘host’ 
member state.  Once this is done, 
notification to the ‘home’ member state 
                                                 
57 First Company Law Directive – especially article 2 on disclosure 
58 Subject to appropriate majority vote 
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of the old registration 
Article 8 (9), (10), (11) 
allows deletion of the old registration 
Article 11(1), (3) 
Publication of the re and de-registration 
shall take place in the member states 
concerned in line with directive 68/151 
EEC 
Article 8 (12), (13) 
Publication of the re and de-registration 
shall take place in the member states 
concerned in line with directive 68/151 
EEC 
Article 11(4) 
Notice must be given of the SE’s transfer 
of registered office in the Official Journal 
of the European Communities 
Article 14(2) 
 
 
 
Both the procedures also give the right to take steps to ensure the interests of creditors 
and ‘holders of other rights’ which arise before publication of the transfer proposal 
have been adequately protected.  This duty of protection is on the SE in the statute 
(Article 8(7)), but is left to the creditors and holders of the rights themselves to 
require the security is given under the directive (Article 8(1)).  The Directive also 
states that a member state MAY adopt provisions to ensure protection of minority 
shareholders who oppose a transfer.  This would seem to suggest a buy out scheme at 
a fair price, but does appear to leave the discretion for measures of this kind firmly 
within the remit of member states.  Both the statute and the directive forbid transfer 
where insolvency, liquidation or winding-up proceedings have been brought against 
the company in question, but Rajak59 makes the point that this seems to penalise a 
company which was once struggling and may have faced such measures, possibly 
some time ago, but is now a successful and solvent concern. 
 
Only the statute for the SE seems to allow the ‘home’ member state to oppose the 
move by the SE on the grounds of ‘public interest’ within the two months after the 
publication of the transfer proposal.  There are no clues however, as to what ‘public 
interest’ may be. Otherwise the two pieces of legislation – as far as they concern the 
mobility of the legal person – are very similar.  Indeed it makes perfect sense, having 
found what is apparently a workable (or at least non-contentious) system for the 
transfer of the registered office or de facto head office of a company, to apply the 
same concept throughout EC legislation as and when it is required. Neither procedure 
is critical of the domestic conflicts provisions, and each leaves the provisions 
untouched as far as national law is concerned, and is advantageous in proceeding by 
consensus rather than command.  This single procedure is bound to be less 
complicated in the long run than an alternative and acts to harmonise and normalise 
the relationship between an SE and a national corporate form.  Further to this, the 
Supplementary Directive on Employee Involvement which accompanies the SE 
statute is to be employed (as amended) to regulate employee involvement when a 
company relocates under the proposed 14th directive.  Making one procedure different 
                                                 
59 Professor Harry Rajak , “Proposal for a fourteenth European and Council Directive on the transfer 
of the registered office or de facto head office of a company from one member state to another with a 
change in applicable law – The legal issues in the United Kingdom arising out of this proposal” 
European business law review Jan/Feb 2000 pp 43-49   
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to the other may therefore have led to over-complication on the application of 
directive 2001/86. 
 
The new system for transfer of registered office or de facto head office (the very 
phrasing reflects the delicacy of the subject as it is careful to include both ‘connecting 
factors’ which member states may use),60 means that both incorporation states and 
real seat states must shift the parameters of their conflicts provisions, as they now 
must allow a company with its registered office on their territory to move to another 
state without the attendant liquidation, something, which states previously did not 
allow.   
 
Tax Provisions  
 
As with the European Company Statute, provisions for the taxation of a legal person 
which becomes subject to the laws of another state without dissolution have been 
largely ignored in the Directive.  It will be recalled that the infamous Daily Mail case 
centred around just such an issue.  Given that the Directive makes clear that a 
company must be allowed to leave its home state without liquidation, the payment of 
a liquidation tax (the present major disincentive for inter-state corporate mobility) will 
not be an issue.  The company is however still departing from its home state and 
taking itself beyond the home states laws.  It is therefore in the interests of the state of 
departure to receive the tax that it considers to have fallen due, or at least to have a 
security to that effect from the company in question. 61  Rammeloo62 suggests that ‘tax 
neutrality63’ may be a way out of this problem, but then goes further to suggest 
‘purely tax-driven’ transfers should be a ground for the home member state to refuse a 
company leave to depart.  Drury64 makes the point that a potential reason for member 
states to object to the proposed directive would be the fear that large tax payers will 
migrate to more favourable fiscal regimes.  It is of course a valid point, but not a valid 
argument given the overriding ethos of the EU as an internal market with freedom of 
movement, and given the clear approval of this strategy by the ECJ in the Daily Mail 
case itself.  In the current state of EC law, it is difficult to imagine the ECJ allowing a 
state to impose a restriction on a company wishing to leave its territory, or making the 
departure contingent on certain taxes being paid. This would surely be a breach of 
Article three of the Directive,65 as well as a breach of fundamental freedom 
provisions.  
 
Employee Participation  
 
The protection of the rights of employees to participate in corporate governance has 
been fiercely defended by member states which have such provisions in their national 
company law.  However, the provisions differ substantially between EU members, 
                                                 
60 See definitions of these two concepts in Article 2 of the proposed directive 
61 Article 8(2) of the proposed Directive may enable Member states to insist on security for any 
outstanding ‘debts to public bodies’ 
62 Supra n.26 p 310. 
63 Characteristic that taxes do not interfere with the natural flow of capital toward its most productive 
use. 
64 R Drury ‘Migrating Circumstances’ (1999) European Law Review 24 
65 See below, p  
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and some member states have no such provisions at all.  Without harmonisation, 
something that would clearly be resisted by member states, employee participation 
has been the hardest fought and potentially the most divisive issue within the 14th 
Company Law Directive and responsible for the dramatic stalling of the proposed 
legislation in the middle of 2004.   At the time of writing66 it is envisaged  that 
employee participation will be governed by Directive 2001/8667, which will be 
amended to take account of the new legislation if and when it is adopted.  The 
limitations of 2001/86 have already been discussed, but it may be safe to assume that 
where the EU legislation leaves rights unprotected then national provisions such as 
apply to other national corporate forms will be used to protect employees.  Rameloo68 
considers that ‘employees are bestowed with a crucial position’ under Articles 4 and 5 
of the Directive, but this position may be more imagined than real.  True, the transfer 
proposal must make clear how employee representation is to be handled, and the 
likely effect on employees and the proposal and management report must be available 
free to the employees (or other interested bodies) at least a month before the general 
meeting where a vote on the proposal will be taken.  These measures can easily be 
seen as administrative only and more in the spirit of rules already in place in most 
member states that prohibit secrecy when livelihoods are at stake, than a newly 
granted power to employees to make a meaningful contribution to the debate.  It 
seems that employees certainly cannot prevent a company from changing its 
nationality as long as the appropriate majority of shareholders agrees with the move. 
 
Although member states cannot be at fault for wanting to protect their employees, it is 
to be hoped that the constant arguments and delays over this aspect of corporate 
mobility give way to a more pragmatic judgement.  A company wishing to transfer its 
head office or principle place of production within a member state will enter into 
negotiations with the workforce and their representatives with a view to minimising 
the loss of jobs and skilled personnel, but rarely, if ever, would a workforce be able to 
prevent such a move.  The concept of the Internal Market is to make inter state 
mobility as simple (and as numerous) as intra-state.  To suggest that employees and 
their representatives should have more power and rights in one scenario rather than 
the other would be unjustified. 
 
Overall, the strength of European Union companies will be increased with the 
loosening of the stranglehold of the purely national form, whether through the SE or 
through enhanced corporate mobility.  With this increased strength will come an 
increased competitiveness with, for instance, American or Japanese (and latterly 
Chinese) corporate giants, with the attendant rewards for member state economies and 
employment.  Short term thinking in this area should not be allowed to obscure the 
long term goals of the Internal Market in which the free movement of companies may 
have an important part to play.   
 
Article 10(2) 
 
                                                 
66 November 2004 
67 See page 11 – 12 and discussion thereunder 
68 Supra  n 26 p 307 
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A potential major problem in the Directive comes in Article 10(2), which allows real 
seat member states to refuse to register an ‘incoming’ company which does not bring 
its head office with it upon registration, ie, the head office is in another member state.  
This could, in theory, lead to the following situation; 
 
INCORPORATION                            INCORPORATION - ALLOWED          
 
INCORPORATION                            REAL SEAT – MAY BE REFUSED 
 
REAL SEAT                                       INCORPORATION - ALLOWED  
 
REAL SEAT                                        REAL SEAT – MAY BE REFUSED 
 
 
Looked at dispassionately, this can be seen to be exactly the situation that is so 
despaired of presently, and over the last forty years of the internal market, as regards 
secondary establishment.  It is, in effect, allowing real seat adherents to continue to 
practise the theory, while demanding that incorporation member states accept a 
different and quite radical regime to the one on which their conflicts laws have 
traditionally operated. 
 
Although the arguments for the practicality of the real seat doctrine, as enunciated in 
the previous section about the European Company (SE) hold up here as well, the 
different aims of the two pieces of legislation must be remembered.  The whole object 
of the 14th Company Law Directive is to:   
 
…enable companies to transfer their registered office from the member state 
where they are registered to another member state under an appropriate 
procedure providing legal certainty. 69  
 
The concept behind the Directive is surely to allow an English company, registered in 
England and subject to English law, to become a German or Italian company and 
subject to the laws of that member state by following the procedure in the directive, 
and shedding its ‘English nationality’ while simultaneously being endowed with 
German or Italian ‘nationality’ and considering itself subject to the company laws of 
its chosen ‘host state’.  It is to be suggested that one of the main reasons a company 
may put itself through this procedure would be because it finds the company laws of 
another member state more advantageous or attractive than the laws of its home 
member state, and one of the main aims of the directive must be to facilitate the free 
movement of such a company to the advantage of that company in particular and the 
internal market as a whole.   
 
Article 10(2) puts up potentially huge barriers for a company wishing to make a 
transition which the directive is designed to allow with the least possible fuss.  The 
relocation of a company’s head office or principle place of business could represent 
the relocation, (or more likely redundancy and re-recruitment) of hundreds of jobs, the 
                                                 
69 Supra n. 5  
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sale and purchase of real estate, and, by virtue of the definition of ‘head office’ in 
some member states, the relocation of the boards of directors or senior management of 
the company, who would then have to reside within the ‘host’ member state.  These 
factors are going to be major disincentives to corporate bodies considering mobility 
within the EU, and may be grounds for discontent amongst member states that adhere 
to the incorporation theory who see the requirement for compromise on their part with 
no equivalence on the part of real seat theorists.  If a company merely wishes to move 
its registered office, because its principle place of business has, over time, become 
another member state then Article 10(2) is unlikely to be problematic, but again in 
this circumstance, there would be no compromise on the part of real seat member 
states because if the de facto head office was felt to be in a different member state to 
the registered office, and the registered office was in a member state that has the real 
seat as its chosen connecting factor, then the company in question would not be a 
valid company in the eyes of that member state and would not be allowed to take 
advantage of the procedure mooted under the 14th Company Law Directive anyway.   
 
It is hard to see therefore exactly where a real seat member state has to compromise 
its conflicts provisions to align itself with the Directive, except in circumstances 
which are clearly advantageous to it such as when a company wishes to move its head 
office and registered office into such a state.  The directive would facilitate this move, 
which presently would not be allowed by either real seat or incorporation theorists70 
without the winding up and liquidation of the company and its re- incorporation in the 
host state.  By being allowed to demand that the chosen connecting factor is 
respected, real seat states would then gain the added bonus of job creation and the 
fiscal advantages for a given area that go along with a rise in the employment rate.  
However, a state which adheres to the incorporation theory arguably also keeps it’s 
chosen connecting factor with the corporate body, that of the registered office, so the 
directive could be accused of doing no more than accomplishing its task of ensuring 
corporate mobility without liquidation, but allowing the internal conflicts laws of the 
individual member states to stay as far as possible intact.  The fact that some member 
states have an ‘easier’ conflicts provision with regard to the formation and valid 
recognition of a company than others at least as far as secondary establishment goes 
may indeed have already led to a kind of Delaware effect into those member states as 
companies seek to avoid – for instance – onerous capital provisions.  It may be said 
that it is hardly for these member states to complain then if they are expected to 
‘redress the balance’ to a certain extent by making a bigger compromise in terms of 
their conflicts provisions under the proposed directive.   
 
Article 3  
 
Article three of the directive may also be problematic:    
 
…member states shall take all measures to allow a company to transfer its 
registered office or de facto head office to another member state. 
 
                                                 
70 Except possibly Italy 
Hertfordshire Law Journal 3(2), 18-44   
ISSN 1479-4195 Online / ISSN 1479-4209 CDRom 
 
 
© Maureen Johnson 
The moral rights of the author have been asserted.  
Database rights The Centre for International Law (maker).  
 
41
 
All measures?  Rammeloo71 asks if this phrase is going to encompass taxation 
systems too, problems with the ‘home’ state requiring due taxes to be paid before a 
company leaves have been real since before the Daily Mail case and continue to be so.  
Or what about the conflicts provision themselves?  These are surely the biggest 
obstacle to corporate recognition between member states and hence valid corporate 
mobility.  Article three could be seen as the Directives equivalent of Article 1072 of 
the TEC, as a clause establishing a duty of cooperation for the member states in this 
area.  Given the ECJ’s propensity to rely on Article 10 TEC for the furthering of the 
teleological aims of the Community, this could potentially give Article three of the 
Directive a huge scope. 
 
Might ‘all measures’ be read in the same light as ‘all trading rules’ in Dassonville?73 
If so, anything capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra 
community corporate mobility, may be deemed to be in breach of the provision. 
 
As stated in the first section of this paper, the ECJ seems to ‘prefer’ the incorporation 
theory as regards secondary establishment as it is more in tune with the Community’s 
ethos of free movement, the judgement in Centros is clear on this.  What the ECJ has 
yet to explore, and what may easily arise under a challenge to a member state by a 
company wishing to exercise its right to free movement under the directive, is the 
extent to which the conflicts provisions themselves fall under the remit of ‘all 
measures’, as far as primary establishment is concerned.  
 
Given the progressive convergence of the free movement provisions across 
Community law as a whole, this is not difficult to envisage.  The directive will both 
satisfy article 293 in that member states have entered into negotiations with each other 
to secure rights of cross border mobility for legal persons on their territory, and prove 
to be a valuable piece of secondary legislation for the interpretation of those rights by 
the ECJ.  If the convergence of free movement provisions is taken as fact, then in a 
case concerning a member states reluctance to either allow a company to leave it’s 
territory or to welcome an incoming legal person,74 the ECJ’s and the national courts 
duties will be clear:  
 
· Does the member states measure hinder or restrict the freedom?; 
· If yes, is there a valid derogation under the treaty or under secondary 
legislation? (the ‘public interest’); 
· If there is no valid derogation, is it possible to discern a valid ‘rule of reason’ 
due to mandatory requirements of a member state that are non-discriminatory 
and proportionate. 
 
                                                 
71 See fn 26 
72 Member states shall take all appropriate measure, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment 
of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from actions taken by the Community.  They 
shall facilitate the achievement of the Communities tasks.  They shall abstain from any measure which 
could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty. 
73Case 8/74  Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837 
74 Although there is little to suggest this will be a problem 
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It may be that ECJ interpretation of the Directive will indeed come to this conclusion 
based on previous case law concerned with the free movement provisions, and given 
that these precedents are clearly concerned with a fundamental freedom granted under 
the Treaty of Rome, secondary legislation, such as this directive which clearly allows 
the retention of the real seat theory may be found to be in breach of Treaty provisions 
as far as Section 10(2) is concerned. 
  
The next battle to then be fought before the national and European courts will be the 
definition of the ‘public interest’ and the extent to which the ‘rule of reason’ can 
infiltrate this area of law as it has done so many others. 
 
Derogations? 
 
Equating the legal person with the natural person may also suggest that the Article 
39(3) or Article 46 derogations of public health, public policy and public security may 
be available to member states wishing to impose restrictions on corporate mobility, 
but it may be relatively easy to dismiss this claim.  The Articles above are clearly 
based on the nationality of the worker or service provider, but from the corporate 
aspect, the freedom sought is not to operate as a ‘foreign company’ – a right already 
granted under Articles 43 and 48 anyway, and subject to Article 46 – but to transform 
itself into a national company, making any claims of discrimination based on 
nationality spurious.  It seems that as far as the 14th Company Law Directive is 
concerned, it is in the hands of the ‘home’ state only, the state that the company is 
emigrating from, to ensure the procedures and formalities for the transfer are 
complied with.  If they are, there is little legislation a ‘host state’ can turn to in order 
to prevent a company incoming.  Although this balance of power is clearly correct in 
that the emigrating state has nothing to gain from letting a company move and so is 
more likely to see that procedures are strictly complied with.      
 
Conclusion  
 
The Fourteenth Company Law Directive is needed by the European Union because 
the European Union needs corporate mobility.  It is a clearly given fundamental 
freedom and a right increasingly required by the business community battling global 
economies of scale.  Presently the international conflicts rules all but preclude the 
relocation of a corporate body across state lines without liquidation and re-
incorporation in the host state.  Both the incorporation and the real seat theories will 
fail to recognise an incoming company without re- incorporation in spite of the 
perception of incorporation as a more ‘internal market friendly’ provision.  The 
principle problem arising from these facts is that, given the refusal by the ECJ and the 
Commission to enforce Article 293 or Article 65, no secondary legislation or relevant 
case law exists to guide the expectations of a company aspiring to cross border 
mobility.  Thwarted, companies increasingly use the fiction of a ‘brass plate’ 
company in an incorporation member state with the ‘real’ head office then 
transferable – previously only within other incorporation states, but, after Centros, 
arguably throughout the Union.  Although Centros does nothing for the freedom of 
primary establishment of companies, it may be seen  - providing it is sustained and 
built upon by the ECJ - to provide a viable and less fussy alternative to genuine 
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corporate mobility within the EU.  This will be to the disadvantage of states such as 
Germany which will not be able to enforce worker participation provisions within 
companies registered elsewhere, and Denmark which has high capital provisions for 
the setting up of a company.  This may have already led to a ‘Delaware effect’ in 
places such as the UK with it’s low cost incorporation regime.    It may therefore be 
that the 14th Company Law Directive is needed most by the Real seat theorists who 
are increasingly seeing their choice of connecting factor undermined by case law, but, 
in clinging to their conflicts provisions are not readily accessible to new companies 
which may be looking at a Europe wide territory. 
 
The increasing harmonisation of European Company Law and particularly the 
adoption of the European Company Statute are large steps forward, and there is no 
doubt that the choice of the real seat as the connecting factor for an SE is a robust and 
practical decision.  The success or otherwise of the SE may serve to prove to member 
states that the demand for corporate mobility or the truly ‘European Company’ is 
likely to be small which may engender confidence in the 14th Directive.  However, 
even if the demand is miniscule, secondary legislation is still a must.  The co-
existence of the real seat and incorporation theories and the different aims of 
International and European75 law which meet so untidily in this area are still 
problematic.    
 
Progress however has been made and it is obvious that European Law, be it case law 
or legislation is making much more determined efforts to come to grips with the 
problem than member states alone would have had either the power or the inclination 
to do.  Indeed, the recital to the proposed Directive states:   
 
Whereas, in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
set out in art 3(b) of the Treaty, the objectives of making it possible for a 
registered office or de facto head office to be transferred without affecting the 
connecting factors established albeit by diverging national laws cannot be 
satisfactorily achieved by the Member States acting in isolation; whereas they 
are not in a position to organise the entire operation in question since it 
transcends national frontiers whereas these objectives can therefore be achieved 
only through action at Community level.76 
 
Accepting EU legislation as the way forward, and the acceptance of the Statute for a 
European Company appears to show willing on the part of the member states to at 
least bring reasonable discussions to bear on the fourteenth directive.  Indeed, those 
real seat theorists who see their connecting factor undermined as contrary to EU 
freedoms in case law, may be the ones most eager for the protection that the Directive 
appears to grant to them.  By accepting the proposal though, member states also leave 
themselves open to the interpretation of article 3 by the ECJ, which may be less than 
welcome. 
 
                                                 
75 International conflicts provisions aim to discover the ‘proper law’ to be applied in a given situation 
and then are satisfied – EU law is concerned with the legal problems between national and European 
systems on an ongoing and increasingly involved basis. 
76 Note article 3(b) is now Article 5 
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Corporate mobility should  not be a problem within the European Union at this stage 
in its history, any more than the free movement of goods or natural persons.  At each 
stage of the progression of the internal market member states have had to accept that 
cherished national concepts were open to challenge and possible  overruling by the 
‘new legal order’ that has been created by the Treaty of Rome.  National borders are 
now porous and member states accept that except in narrowly defined circumstances, 
they no longer have tight control over who or what moves legally into their territories. 
So it must be with legal persons also, and legislation in the shape of the 14th Company 
Law Directive is a clearly defined and workable solution based as it is on the 
successfully proposed Statute for a European Company. At the time of writing, the 
proposal is inexplicably stalled again, with a September deadline for a fresh draft 
fading into the distance, but hopefully the hiatus will be shortlived.  With proposals 
for a European Private Company Directive already in the pipeline, the fa ilure or 
shelving of the Directive would be an unmitigated disaster for European Company 
Law and the internal market and would allow the compartmentalisation of the 
corporate body along strictly national lines to continue unabated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
